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The Nigerlo lnler-Bonk ond Monelory Pollcy Roles Nexus:
Any Dlscernoble Long-Run Relollomhlp?
YusufD. Bulus'
lnler-bonk mokets are omong the most impoiont in the finonck, syslem. They ore lhe
bonk' impr€menlolion of monetory policy dnd hove o significont effeci
on the economy. Ironsocrbns in lhe interSonk funds morket olcvide signol of whot
obtoins in the open credit mo*et. To p@Yide fot stobility in shoruerm interesf rotes, lhe
Monelory Policy Rore rMPR, os the 'op€rcrthg r'mtrument'seryes cs on indicotive rote for
tronsoclions in lhe intertor* money morket os well os other deposit money bonk' IDMBS/
inleresl rotes. It is this re,otiensh,p betlveen lhe inter-bonk ond ttl€ monetory policy rotes
thot this @per examhed. fiE findings indicote thot the rotes ore cdnlegrored ond hove
o long+un relationship, ju$ing from lhe significonce of the unit (@t tes, for the residuol
ond the coetficienl ol the euor conection vqiable in the eror corection model. lt is,
howevs. fhe subrnisgon of lhis poper thol mtrch more investigation is needed on o
number of issues such os the effect of liquidily tt&rding in the inter-bank motkel spreod,
ond the imryct of poseble lending relolionships belween bonk in the mo*et on flow ot
funds ond the inler-bonk rofe, ornong others. Ihese issues moy provide significon, ingght
on the bdlovio(]i. of ttle Nigedon inler-bonk rotefocus of centrol

Xeyword; lnter-bonk Rote. Monelory Poficy Rote. Cointegrotion, Finonciol
Slobfrity.
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lnlroducllon
nleresl roles ploy on importont role in our economic lives. They ore the cost of
bonowing for those who need resources ond reword for lending lo those wiih
sovings. Higher interest rotes tend lo restricl the growlh of credit. moking it
horder for businesses to get finoncing ond for individuols to fhd or keep iobs. Yet,
os importont os interesl roles ore, o molor concern of the rnonetory outhority is
lheir iendency to exhibit enolic behoviour i.e. lo fluctuote too much. ll is,
therefore, the oblective of every cenhol bonk lo eliminole obrupt chonges in
interesl rotes (8oche ond Bornhordsen, 2009). Though the objeclive could be
considered o secondory gool relotive lo the monetory policV gools of low
;nflolion, stoble economic growth ond finonciol stobility. the reoson for this
hierorchy'6 ihot interesl role stobility ond, of course, exchonge role stobility ore
meons of ochieving lhe ultimote gool of stobilizing lhe economy; they ore nol
ends unlo themselves.
yl6uf O. 8u,us is ol the Deporlmenl ot Economics, No6orowo Slote Unive6ity, Keffi. I om grctelul to
Ptof. J. S- Odomo, Dr. M. A- Adetiyi ond othet anonymous reviewe5 for their helplul cornmenls ond
suggesrions- Ihe views expressed i,n ,fxs poper ore lhose of the oulhot ond do noi necessonit
represenl lf]€ views ot lhe insritution fo which he is oftilioled o( those of the CBN or ils porcy.
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ll is eosy lo see how interesl role vololility is o problem. First, most people respond
to low inlerest rcrtes by bonowing ond spending more. lndividuols toke out loons
lo purchose ccrs, new opplionces ond lhe like, while corporolions bsue more
bonds ond use lhe proceeds lo enlorge their operotions. On the olher hond,
when interesl rqles rise, people sove ond spend less. So by roising expenditure
when interest roles ore low ond reducing expendilure when interesl roles ore
high, inleresl rotes volotility mokes outpul unstoble.
Second, inierest roles voloiility meons higher risk - ond o higher nik premium - on
long-lerm boncb. Risk mokes finonciol decisions more difficull, lowering
productivity ond moking the economy less efficient. Thus, since cenlrol bonks
control short-term inlerest rotes, they ore in o position lo conlrol lhb risk ond
stobilize the economy.

lo the reforms in the finonciol system ond the lberolhotion of interest roles in
Nigerio, interesl rotes were more or less specified or fixed by the cenlrol bonk. ln
other words, rotes were determined by fiol. But with the liberolzolion of interest
rotes. olongside oiher rotes, (to be morkel delermined). il become necessory
lhot on indirecl opprooch to influencing lhe movernent. so os io moderole lhe
fluctuotion ond, of course, the spreod os o meosure of the cost of intermediolbn,
become necessory.
Pnlor

Among the mosl imporlonl ployers in finonciol morkets throughoul the world ore
centrol bonks, which ore government outhorities in chorge of monetory policy.
Cenhol bonks' octions offect interest roles. omounl of credit. money supply,
output ond inflolicn. Though h'slory hos il on record lhot centrol bonk slorted out
os the governmenl's bonk, lhey hove over the yeors odded vorious other
functions. A modern centrol bonk nol only monoges lhe govemment finonces
but, provides on oroy of services lo deposit money bonks which mokes il o
bonkers'bonk.

Discounl lending policies ore o criticol port of o modem cenlrol bonk's
engogement. Cenlrol bonks provide loons ot o rote thot is obove their lorgel
interest role, thereby guoronteeing commerciol bonks o supply of liquidity during
limes of crisis, ond ensuring ihol lhe ovemighl interbonk lending rotes remoin less
lhon or equol lo their lending rote. lt is this price of funds tronsler in the inier-bonk
fund morkei (moslly refened to in lhe onolysis of cosl of bonowing) ond
responsiveness of fhe rote io the cenlrol bonk lorgel rote, the monetory policy
role (mpr), thot this poper oltempis lo exomine. To do this. the poper is slructured
into six sections. Following lhe inlroduciion is the theorelicol ond empiricol isues
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considered in seclion 2, which is followed by o brief rev'ew of monetory policy h
Nigedo since 1986 in section 3. The methodology of the study is presented in
section 4, while doto ond empiricol resulls come up in sectbn 5. The poper ends
with some conclusbns in seclion 6.

ll. Theorellcd ond Empldcol lrsues
There ore mony foctors thot influence investmenl decision, bul two con be
considered outslonding. The fkst is the cunent level of economic octivity ond the
outlook for the fulue (business confidence), such thol lhe lorger the volume of
cunent soles ond the more prosperous the future oppeors, lhe greoler lhe
incentive lo expond produclive copocity. The second is lhe cosl of bonowing
(i.e. the role of interesl). Noturolly, the higher the rote of interest, the more likely it
'rs lhot bonowing will be discouroged. Privole seclor demond for credit b,
lherefore, likely to vory inversely with the rote of interesl, given the level of, ond
oullook of business octivify.
Whle the economic ond finonciol systems moy be foirlystoble most of lhe time,
wtEn left on their own, they ore prone to episodes of extreme vololility. Centrol
bonks work to reduce the volotility of the economic ond finonciol systems by
pusuing five specific obiectives nomely; low ond stoble inflolion; high ond stoble
red growlh, together with high employment; stoble finonciol morkets ond
inslilutions; stoble interest rotes; ond o stot e exchonge rote,

o morket-bosed economy. They
provide the informotion individuols ond firms need lo ensure tho, resources ore
ollocoted lo lhei most productive uses. Roising the price of o producl, for
instonce, is o signol thol demond hos increosed, so producing more is worthwhile.
However, inflotion degrodes the informotion conient of p(bes. When oll p{ices
ore rising together, understonding the reoson becomes difficult. Did consumers
decide they liked on item, by shifting demond? Did the cost of producing the
ilem rise, shifiing supply? Or wos inflotion responsible for the iump? lf the economy
is lo run efficienfly. we must be oble to tell the difference. Thus, the ob.iective of
price stobility is onologous to keeping inflolion low ond sloble.
Prices ore cenlrol to everylhing thot hoppens in

Wrlh respect to ensuring high ond stoble reol growlh, centrol bonks employ the
tool of interest rotes odjuslment 1o moderote fluctuotions in busines cycles.
Booms ore populor bul recessions ore not. ln recessions, people get loid off ond
businesses foil. Without steody income, individuols struggle to effect poymenis for
lronsoclions lhey enler inlo. Mosi iimes. consumers pull bock, hurting businesses
lhol rely on lhem to buy products os unplonned invenlories grow, increosing
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unused copocity, hence more ond more loyoffs. Thus. the use of inleresl rote
od.iuslmenl tool b informed by the ideo thot there b some long-run sustoinoble

level

of produclicn colled potentiol oulput thol

depends

on foclors like

technology, size of copitol stock ond lobour force or the number of people who
con work. Growlh in these foclors leods lo growlh in polentiol oulpr-rt.

There ore olso limes when growth rises obove susloinoble rotes, ond the
economy overtEols. These periods moy seem to b.ing prosperity. bui they do
not losl forever, os they ore followed by reduced spending, lower business
inveslment ond loyoffs. ln such periods, ihe policy oction would be lo roise
interest rotes ond keep the economy from operoling ot unsustoinoble levels.
Unstoble growlh creotes risk for which invesiors need to be compensoled in lhe
form of hlgher inleresl rotes. With higher interest rotes. businesses bonow les,
which meons thot they hove fewer resources to invest ond grow. Stobility leods to
higher growth in the long-run.
Finonciol siobility is on integrol port of every modern centrol bonk's concem. As
Cecchetti (2008) puts it;

"The ftnoncial system is like dumbing: when it work, we toke it for
gronted, but when i, doesn'l work wolch ouf. lf people lose foilh rn
bonk ond finonciol morkels, they will rush to low-isk oltemoriver ond
intermediolion will stop. Sove6 will not le nd ond bonowers will nol be
oble to boffow....... When lhe finonciol sysrem co,lopse' economic
octivities do, too". p 360
As the government's bonk,

lhe centrol bonk occupies o privileged posilion. lt hos
o monopoly of issuonce of cunency. The obilily to prinl cunency meons thot lhe
centrol bonk con control lhe ovoilobility of money ond credit in lhe economy
ond lhis is conied out by odiusiing short-term interesl rotes. The odlusiments ore
undertoken under the fromework of monetory policy.
Agoin os o bonkers' bonk, its doy-to-doy role involve; (i) providing loons during
limes of finonciol stress, (ii) monoging the poyment system, ond (iiil oversee
deposit money bonks ond lhe finonciol syslem (Cecchelti, 2008). Every country
needs o secure ond efficienl poyments syslem. People require woys to poy eoch
other, ond finonciol insiitulions need o cheop ond relioble woy to lronsfer funds
lo one onolher. The focl thot oll bonks hove occounts with lhe centrol bonk
mokes it lhe noiurol ploce to go for these interbonk poymenls to be setlled. ln
lodoy's world. interlconk poyments ore extremely importonl.
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ll.l

frqnsqcllon3ln lhe lr lr-Bonk tund3llorkel
The norne inler-bonk funds come trom the tocl thol lhe funds bonks trode wilh
ore lhei deposil bdonces with lhe cenlrol bonk. On ony given doy, bonks torget
the level ot reserves they would like to hold ot the close of busines. But os the
doy goes by, the normol flow of businers moy leove lhem with more or less
reserves lhon ,hey wonl lo hold. This discreponcy between octuol ond desfed
reserves gives rise lo o morket for reserves, wilh some bonks lending out thek
excess funds ond olhers bonowing lo cover o shortfoll. Without this morket, bonks
would need to hold o substonliol omounl of excess reseryes os insuronce ogoinst
shortfolls.

lnler-bonk funds morkel, os lhe nome connotes, is o morkel where bonk
undertoke funds tronsoction lo enoble them meet the cosh or liqui.dity needs of
thei customers. These tronsoctions do become necessory becouse on individuol
bonk con hordly moinloin ar equilibrium cosh or liquidity holding (thot motches
the demond for ond supdy of liquidity/cosh) ol ony given poinl h time. Whle
tronsoctions ore often mode through brokers, there ore biloterol ogreemenh
between bonks. Since there is no colloterol to foll bock on in the event of nonpoymenl, which mokes such loons unsecured, the bonowing bonk musl be credil
worthy in the eyes of the lending bonk, olherwise lhe loon connol be mode.
Policy- mokers believe thol the inlerbonk funds morket provides voluoble
informotion oboul the hedth of individuol bonks. When o bonk connot gel on
overn!7hl loon from ony other bonk, it is the frst sign of lhe foct thot something b
wrong with thot porticulor bonk. The inlerbonk funds morkeJ lronsocts on
ovemighl. or lerm such os 7-doys, 30-doys ond 9o-doys, plocemenl of funds.

Generdly, it is theorelicolly posited thot lronsoclions in lhe inter-bonk funcls
morket provide signol of whol obtoins in lhe open credit morket. The overoge
inlerest rote on ovemight loons is the overnight rote, which is the shortest-lerm
morkel interest rote, ond os such it hos o cruciol role in lerm structure models. ll
olso lies ot the heort of monetory policy (Bernonke ond Blinder, 1992). However,
oporl from ,he role of inleresi (cost of lronsoclion) in the morket thot influences
lhe iempo of oclivities in the mo*et, olher determining foctors ore liquidity
position of the bonks, ond chonge in the demond for foreign exchonge which
delermines the frequency with which bonks occess the morkel for funds lo cover
thek bids ot the Aulonomous Foreign Exchonge Morkel (AFEM) or Wholesole
Dulch Auction System (WDASI.

o"*

* ***

6

Economic qnd Financinl Revie*

Central Bank of Nigeria

ll.2

June 2010

l

lnler-bonk Role ood onelory Pollcy Tronsmisllon
The monetory policy rote (mpr) is the Monelory Policy Committee's primory policy
hstrument. Finonciol morket porliciponts ore consionfly speculoling oboul lhe
movemenl in this rote, ond whenever lhe Monelory Policy Committee meels,
morket porticiponls eogerly owoil ihe onnouncemenl of either on increose or
decreose in the monetory policy rote. ll is importont to nole thol while lhe
monetory policy rote is set by lhe Centrol Bonk's Monetory Policy Commitlee, the
hler-bonk funds rote is lhe role ot which tronsoclions belween bonks toke ploce.

Ihe inter-bonk money morket rote (irl slonds ol the shortest end of ihe ybld
curve. ond is the operolionol iorget for the monetory policy rote (mpr). Therefore,
underslonding lhe foclors behind the dynomics of lhe ir is relevont not only for
porliciponts in the inter-bonk morket, bul olso for privote inveslors ond monelory
oulhorilies. lndeed, the ir b o key benchmork for inierest rotes in the shorl lerm
money morket ond its movement moy hove effects on lhe \^rhole lerm shuclure
(Toylor ond Willioms, 2m8). Equolly importonl is the foct lhot lhe inlertonk
morket represents the fist sloge of the moneiory tronsmissbn chonnel, where
monetory policy octions fisl come in contoct with lhe resl of lhe finonciol system.
An effective monetory policy requires thot the overnight interest rote remoins ol
on overoge oround the mpr (Ahumodo, et ol, 2009).

ll.3

lending RelolioBldpr ond lhe lnler-bonk ]lorket Opelollons
Lending relotionship ore on importonl feoture of the inter-bonk morket, ond these
reloiionships ollow bonks to obioin Insuronce ogoinst liquidity shocks (Cocco, et
ol. 2009). Relolionships con only exist if there ore frequent ond repeoted
inleroclions between bonks, il bonowers ond lenders moy set terms for the loon
thol depend on the identity of lhe counlerporty, or on the ongoing relotionship
(Boot, 2000). This is indeed lhe cose for dkecl loons in the inter-bonk mqtet.
Diect loons ore lhe result of privole negoliotions between bonower ond lender,
who ogrees on lhe omount, inleresi rote ond moturity of lhe loon.

Ihe inter-bonk morket is frogmented in nofure. For direct loons which occounl for
lhe vost moiority of lending volume. the omount ond ihe interest rote on eoch
loon ore ogreed on o one-on-one bosis between bonowing ond lending
institutions. Other bonk do not hove occess to the some lerms, ond moy not
even know thot the loon took ploce.
Relolionship moy be on importonl feoture of behoviour in frogmented mo*ets,
porticulorly given thot eoch ogent chooses whom lo interocl with. Agoin, in os
much os tronsoctions cre negotioled on o one-on-one bosis, ogents moy
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condition lhe lerms of the honsoclion on the identity of the counterporty (Cocco,
et ol. 2009). Stigum {1990}, qroted in Cocco (2005), further expound on the ideo
of the importonce of relotionship in lhe inler-bonk morket when he wrole,
'To cultivote corespondents lhol wi,, sell tunds to them, lorge bonts
stond reody to buy whotever sums lhese bonks ofter, whelher lhey
need o,l these funds q not. lf they get more funds lhon they need,
lhey sell off lhe swplut-.' p 25.

lhot bonowers ond lenders of fund in the
Porluguese inter-bonk morket lend lo rely, more thon they usuolly do. on loons
lrom, ond to, bonks with whom they hove o close relotionship when lhey hove o
lorger imbdonce of funds. ln this woy, lending relqlicnships provide insuronce
ogoinsl the ,bk of o shortoge or excess of funds dudng the resewe moinlenonce
period. Wilh this, they opined thot lending relotionshh's ploy on importont role in
promoling lfrc stobility of lhe inter-bonk morket during periods of low liquidity ond

The study by Cocco, et ol (2009) found

time of crisis,

We con identify two purposes why bonk estoblish lending relolbnships in ihe
inler-bonk rnorket;
(i)

ln inler-bonk mo*ets. finonciol inslitutions engoge in unsecured bonowing

ond lending of funds. They do so to insure ogoinst idiosyncrotb liquidity
shocks orising from lhe behoviour of reloil depositors (Freixos ond Jorge.
200O). when o given bonk is foced with unexpecledly lorge number of
withdrowols from its reloil customen, il moy bonow lhe funds needed to
meet these withdrowols from other bonks in lhe interbonk morket.
(ii)

Bonowing to solisfy lhe reserve requirements moy be onolher purpose.
Over o given lime period, bonks' reserves musl be, ol leost, equol to o
given proportion of their short-term liobiliiies. This is the reserve
moinlenonce period or setflemenl period ond it is o disiinctive feoture of
the inler-bonk morket. This period vory from economy lo economy.r ln
cose o bonk connot meet its reserve requirements, it moy use lhe
discount window lo bonow from the Centrol Bonk, which ocls os o lender
- of - lost resod. To resorl to thot. however, is no, without cosls; bonks must
poy on inlerest rote higher thon lhe prevoiling morkel interest rote on o
loon of similor molurity, ond mosl importonlly, lhere ore lorge implicit costs

t The reserve
2

rKinlenorce period for Nigeriq bonks wqs reviewed do,vnwcd trom 8 \ teeks in 2004 lo
weeks ond lt|e cornpulolion o, reserve requiremenl is bosed on eoch bonk's lotol deposil lioblitles.
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ossocioted wilh using the discount whdow. os the finonciol institution is
seen by the cenlrol bonk os not being oble to properly monoge ils
reserves (Sfigum, l99O). For lhb. bonks moke every effort lo ovoid using the
discouni window.
Therefore. since bonks must hold on overoge o minimum of reserves, shorloges of
liquidiiy ot the end of the mointenonce period will often leod to speciol
behoviour of overnight roles during those doys (Hortmonn, el ol. 2001), os bonks
thot hove not yet sotisFred their reserve requirements will be in o weok posilion.
This suggesls thot bonks moy wish lo estoblish relotionships for insuronce purposes
ond, in porticulor, ogohsl risk of o shortoge of funds ot the end of lhe reserve
mointenonce period.2

ll.4 liquldfi Efiects on l]rler-bonk Rqte

The liqudity of the morket offecls direclly the omounl of resources lhot
commercicl bonks hove ot their disposol ond which they will consequenlly be
willing lo lend in the inter-bonk morket. However, there ore only sconty empiricol
sludies lhol hove considered the effect of doly liquidity conditions on the onolysis
of the ir (Homilton, 1995 ond Wurtz, 2003. omong few). ln foci, the lilerolure
generolly onolyzes the functioning of the hler-bonk morket using o generol
fromework in which bonk' reserve positions ore offected by rondom shocks ond
where lhe inter-bonk mo*el ollows bonk to fulfill their monlhly reserve
requiremenl (e.9. A,len ond Gole, 2000, omong others).
Liquidity provision in lhe inter-bonk morket involves droinoge ond injection ot
funds through open morkel operotions by the cenkol bonk usuolly ot mpr
(discretionory operotions), ond permonent credil lines through privole deposilors.
An odded liquidity source for the morket comes through deposits from pension
funds. The use of discretionory operotions, insleod of credit focilities. could be
inierpreled os o high degree of commitment of lhe centrol bonk io toke the ir
close to the mpr, which could leod to the gop between rhese rotes being closed
foster.

el ol. (2009, on Chile indicotes thot lhe ir ond the
mpr move together very closely ond, when lhese voriobles deviote from eoch
olher, ihe speed of convergence is oround 30 percent per doy. ln terms of the
The resulls of work by Ahumodo,

moy olso foce lhe ri5k of excess of funds. This moy olso help explqin the lorge lroding volume
observed in lhe interbonk morket. Acco(ding lo Lyons (1995), o lorge port ol iroding vcrrne observed
in frogmenled morkels is irrsl due to bo.rowers ocquiring funds lhol they do nol reolly need ond then
selling thern. 8d why do bonowers of funds occepl fund lhey reolly hove no need fo€ The on5wer i5
lhol bofiowers of such funds occept them becouse they do not wish to ieopordize relotionships.
2 Bonks
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explonotory voriobles, lhe colendor effects ond open morkel operotions especiolly the discretionory operolions - ore the mosi relevont in exdoining the
dynomics of the ir Regording the relevonce of morket liquidity provided by the
centrol bonk, they find thol lhe centrol bonk doyed on importont role during lhe
somple pe{iod, while p{ivole deposilors do not help to significontly improve lhe
explonotion of the dynomics of the ir. The permonent 6edil lines ore nol
stotisticolly significont ond thb situolbn could be due to lhe foct ihol this
instrumenl is ovoiloble on o doily ftequency ond, lherefore. lhe morkel hos
intemolized ils operolion in lhe voluotbn of the ir.

A number of other stud'res hove confimed thot monetory poaby octions hove
predictoble effects on shoruerm interest rote.3 For exomple, the results of the
study by Azi:kpono, et ol. (2007) show high responses of the overnighl prime interbonk lendhg roles (PIBR) ond the lhree+nonth negotioble cerlificole of deposil
(NCD) to monelory policy octions in Soulh Afrbo between 1973 ond 2004. Roley
ond Sellon {1995) show thot short-term roles in lhe US follow the some trend os lhe
federol funcls rote. Dole (1993) meosures ihe short-term response o, lhe UK morket
roles lo monetory policy octions by the Bonk of Englond. The results of Dole' study
show lhot pol'rcy octions by the Bonk of Englond hove significonl posilive effect
on inlerest roles of oll mofurilies. Nevertheless, lhese effech decline os moturity
lenglhens.

deorth of works on the ettect of monetory policy octions on
interest rotes. The wo* by Chuku (2009) only ottempls lo meosure lhe effect of
monelory policy innovolions (both quonlity ond price bosedl on oulpul ond the
generol price level. While lhe resuli indicote the Minimum Redbcount Rote ond
Reol Effective Exchonge Role os hoving o neulrol ond fleeling effect on outpul,
the generd obiective of the work remoin the some os those of Uchendu (1996),
Nnonno (2001), Adomgbe (2004), Bologun (2007) ond Omotor (2007). These
sfudies were more concemed with the effecl of monetory policy oclions on
growth-reloted voriobles such os output, investment, generol p.ice level ond the
ln Nigerio, there

is

likes.

The foregoing review hos helped fo exptoin the mony choroclen'slics of ,he
interbonk funds morket ond results of empiricol sludies on the effecl of monetory
policy oction on money morket rotes.

Monelory polby oclions could either be ttrough quonlily$osed nominol onchors os in lhe cose of
Op€rolions (OMO) to etlecl chonges in money supply, or tlyough price-bosed
^.lcrkei
nominol onctlo$
os in ttte cose of chorEing ihe morElory poffcy rote (MPR) o( the efteclive

3

using Open

exchonge role (EERI.
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i/lonelory Poffcy Slnc6 1986.
Direct controls, peryosive government intervention in lhe finonciol system resulting
in the stifling of compelition ond resource misollocolion, necessiloted the
introduction of the Struclurol Adiuslment Progromme (SAP) in 1986. SAP wos o
comprehensive economic restructuring progromme which emphosized
increosed relionce on morkel forces. ln line with this orientolicn, finoncki sector
reforms were initi<rted to enhonce competition, reduce dblorlion in investmenl
decisions ond evcrve o sound ond more efficient finonciri syslem. ltre reforms
which focused on struclurol chonges, moneiory policy, inlerest rote
odministrotion ond foreign exchctnge monogemeni, encomposs both finonciol
morkei liberolizolbn ond institutionol building in lhe finoncbl seclor. ltle brood
objectives of the iironciol seclor reform include:
Bdel Revlew ol Nlgedo's

Removol of controls on interest rotes lo increose the level of sovings ond
improve ollocotive efficiency;
Eliminotion of non-price rolioning of credit to reduce misdkecled credil
ond increose compelilion;

Adoption of indireci monelory monogement in ploce of

lhe

direcl

conlrol regime;
Enhoncing of institutionol structure ond supervision,'

Strenglhenhg the money ond copitol morkets lhrough policy chonges
ond dislress resolution meosures; ond
lmproving lhe linkoges between formol ond informol finonciol sectors
The obiectives of monetory policy since 1985 remoined the some os in the eodier

period, nomely: the stimulolion of oulpul ond employmenl. ond the promotion of
domestic ond exlernol stobilily. ln line with the generol ph osophy of economic
monogemenl under SAP, monelory policy wos oimed ol inducing the
emergence of o morkel-orienled finonciol system for eftec'live mobilizotion of
finonciol sovings ond efficient resource ollocotion. The moin instrumenl of the
morketbosed fromework is lhe open morket operotions. This is complemented by
reserve requiremenls ond discounl window operotions. The odoption of o morketbosed fromework such os OMO in on economy thol hod been under direct

. Ihis
\

section benefitted immensely from moleriols ovoilot

a.rw.cenbonk.org/monelorypolicy/conducl.osp

e on the

Bonk's web5ite;
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control for long, requked substonl'ol inprovement in the mocroeconornlc, legol
ond regulotory envkonment.

ln order to improve mocroeconomic slobility, efforts were diected ot the
monogernenl of excess liquidity; thus o number of rneosures were inlroduced to
reduce liqrility in lhe sr|/stem. These included the reduction in the moximum
ceiling on credit growth ollowed for bonk; lhe recoll of the speciol deposits
requiremenls ogoinst ouhtonding extemol poymenl oreors to CBN ftom bonks,
obolition of the use of foreign guoronrees/cunenqf deposits os colloterols for
Noiro loons ond the withdrowol of public sector deposits from bonks to lhe CBN.
Also effeclive August 1990, the use of siobilizotion securilies lor the purposes of
reducing the bulging size of excess liquidity in bonks wos re-inkoduced.
Commerciol bonks'cosh reserve requtements were increosed in 1989, 1990, 1992,
1996 ond 1999 .
The rising level of fiscol deficils wos idenlified os o mojor source of
mocroeconomic instobility. Consequently, govemment ogreed not only to
reduce the size of its deficits but olso lo synchronize fiscol ond monetory policies.
By woy of inducing efficiency ond encouroging o good meosure of fleibility in
bonks' credil operotions, lhe regulolory environment hos improved.
Consequenfly, lhe sector-specifa credil ollocolion torgets were compressed inlo
four sectoc in 1986. ond lo only two in 1987. From October 1996, oll rnondotory
credil ollocotion mechonisms were obolished. The commerciol qnd rnerchoni
bonks were subjecled to equol treotmenl since thei operolions were lound lo
produce siTilor effects on ihe monetory process. Areos of perceived
disodvontoges lo merchont bonks were hormonized in line with the need to
creote o conducive envkonmenl for their operolions. The liquidity effect of lorge
deficits finonced moinly by ihe Bonk led io on occelerolion of monetory ond
credit oggregote in 1998, relolive lo stipuloled torgets ond the performonce in
the precedhg yeor. Oulflow of funds lhrough the CBN weeldy foreign exchonge
ironsoclion ot the Aulonomous Foreign Exchonge Mo*et (AFEM) ond, to o lesser
extent, ot Open Morket Operotion (OMO) exerted some moderoling effect.

The reinlroduclion of the Dutch Auction system (DAS) of foreign exchonge
monogernenl in July 2002 engendered relotive stobility, ond stemmed furlher
depletion of reserves during the second holf of ?ffJ'2. However, lhe finonciol
system wos typicolly morked by ropid exponsion in monetory oggregoles,
porticulorly during lhe second holf of 2000, influenced by the monelizotion of
enhonced oil receipts. Consequenfly, monelory growlh occeleroted signfficontly,
exceeding policy torgets by subslonliol morgins. Sovings rote ond the inter-bonk
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coll rotes fell generolly due lo lhe liquidity surfeit in the bonking system lhough the
spreod between deposit ond lending roles remoined wide.

lll.l Ihe lnlroduclion ol lhe Monetory Polcy Rote (ltPR)
Over time. lhe CBN hos recognized thoi ochieving stoble prices would require
continuous re-ossessment ond evoluotion of ih monelory policy implementoiion
fromewort to enoHe it respond to the ever-chonging economic ond finonciol
environrnenl. lt b ogoinsf this bockground thot the Bonk introduced o new
monetory policy implementotion fromework lhot iook effect on I lrh December,
2006. The uttimole gool of the new fromewo(k is to ochieve o sloble volue of lhe
domestic curency through siobility in short-ierm interest rotes oround on
"Operoling Torget", lhe inleresl role, which b determined ond operoled by the
CBN . The "Operoting Torgel" rote i.e the "Monetory Policy Rote" ( MPR ). sewes
os on indicotive rote for tronsoction in ihe inler-bonk money morket os well os
other deposit money bonks' (DMBs) inlerest roiesThe moin operoling principle guiding the new policy is to control lhe supply of
setflement bolonces of bonks ond motivole the bonking system lo lorget zero
bolonces ot the CBN lhrough on octive inter-bonk lroding or lronsfer of bolonces
ot the CBN. This is oimed ol engendering symmetric lreoiment of deficils ond
surpluses in the settlemenh occounls, so thol for ony bonk, the cosl of on
overdroft ot the Cenlrol Bonkwould be equol to the opportunity cosl of holding o
surplus wilh lhe bonk.
The Cenlrol Bonk inlerventlon in lhe morkel tokes the form of o slonding lending

focility thot ensures orderly morkel operolions or behoviour by ollernoting
ovoidoble interest volotility. The stonding lending focility is ovoiloble os on
overnight lending lo bonk with deficits, ol o fixed interest rote. i.e lhe upper
bond of the CBN inlerest rote conidor. The Bonk stonds reody to supply ony
omount lhe bonks moy require ol the lending rote. The Cenhol Bonk olso set up o
slonding deposit focitity thol poys bonks wilh surplus funds. o fixed interesl rote in
their deposit or reseryes which they keep wilh the Bonk. This onongement ollows
the Bonk lo keep the ovemighl inter-bonk interesl role in between lhe conldor
wllh on upper ond lower limil on inleresl role.

oi l0 per cent, using ihe then role of inflotion role ond the expected
inflotion role oulcome of 9.0 per ceni for fiscol 2005 os o guide to ensure thol
inlerest rotes remoin posilive in reol terms. There is o spreod of 50O bosis poinls
oround the role. i.e 300 bosis points below ond 300 bosis poinls obove. This
tronsloles into o lower limil of 7 per cent, represenling thol roie ol which CBN
MPR wos set

tokes deposits from the bonk.
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thot the Cenlrol Bonk is oble to
operole in the morkel doily ond ensures odequote liquiclity is provided to enoble
bonk troding in the inler-bonk msket to comdele setllement ot interest rotes
oround the MPR. lnter-bonk rote b, lherefore, mointoined ot o level belween the
lending ond deposits rotes of CBN. Ihe moinlenonce of inleresl roles bond hos
helped significontly lo reduce the volotility in the morket compored lo lhe inieris

bonk rotes experienced in the post.
The Wholesole Dutch Auclion System (WDAS) reploced the Reloil Dutct Auclion
System (DAS) in the first quorter of lhe yeor under review. ln pursuonl of furlher

of the foreign exchcrge morkel the bureoux de chonge wos
odmilled inlo the WDAS window during lhe second quorter of Zn6. The
odmittonce of the BDC's to the WDAS window led to the unificotion of the
liberolizot'ron

exchonge role between the officiol ond porollel morkels.
The obiective of monelory policy in 2006 wos sustoining price stobility ond noninflotionory growlh. os enunc'roted in lhe Nolionol Economic Empowermenl ond
Development Strotegy (NEEDS). The torget for single digit inflotion wos ochieved
os inflolion rote slood ot 8.5 per cent by December 20O6.
Up to 2007, lhe frornework for monelory policy monogemenl remoined lhot of
monelory torgeting. The Cenlrol Bonk of Nigerio (CBNI odopted vorious policy
meosures oimed ol contoining ihe growth of monetory oggregotes in order lo
ochieve monelory ond price stobility. Open Morkel Operotions (OMOI remoined
ihe mojor tool of liquidity monogement. Other policy meosures hcluded
increosed 'ssuonce of lreosury securities in the primory morkel to molup excess
liquidity; use of deposit ond lending focility to encouroge inter-bonk honsoclions
os well os speciol soles of foreign exchonge, including swop orongements. NTBS
of vorious tenors (91-. 182- ond 364-doy) were ouctioned during the period.

Ihe liquidity monogement efforts of lhe CBN yielded the expected resulls os the
single-digit inflotion rote wos suslolned during the yeor. ln oddition, lhe exii
reserye money torgel under the Pol'rcy Support lnslrumenl (PSl) wos ochbved in
June 200/. Over the end-December 2006 level, provisbnol dolo indicole thol
brood money supply (M2) grew by I 1.03 per cent in June 2007 ond furlher by 21.3
ond 25.31 per cenl in September ond October 2007, respectively. When
onnuolized, lhe M2 grew by 28.44 ond 30.25 per cent, in September ond October
2007, respectively, compored with 33.3 ond 39.5 per cenl in the conesponding
months of 2006. The growih of M2 wos driven by the hcreose in foreign ossets
(nel) of the bonking system os well os the ropid rise in credit to the privote seclor

*i,ioii1,;**,,
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since the end of the second quorter. Wiih the CBN'S drive to contoin excess
liquidity in the bonking syslem. both M2 ond reserve money still remoined outside
the lorgets by lhe end ot m7. Al the end of lhe second quorler, oggregote
domestic credit (net) to the economy declined by 56.1I per cent. but increosed
by 98.99 per cenl in Oclober 2007. Also, credil to governmenl (nel) declined by
51.9 per cent in Seplember compored io o decline of 56 per cenl ol lhe end of
the second quorter. Bul credit to the privole sector, which hod moinloined on
upword trend for most ot m7, rose to 34.32 ond 52.0 per cent in June ond
September, respeclively.

ol November 2@7, lhe economy ochieved o commendoble level of extemcl
reserves of oboul US$50.0 blion lhot wos copoble of supporting opproximotely
23 months of current foreign exchonge disbursemenls. This represented on
increose of !8.06 per cent when compored with lhe level of US$2.42 billion
As

recorded in lhe conesponding period of 2006.

Wilh ihe implementotion of the new Monelory Policy Rote (MPR) ond the
odoption of the CBN slonding focilities, volotility in inter-bonk rotes fumed out lo
be moderole wilh roles hovering oround lhe MPR. The MPR wos reviewed thrice
during lhe yeor. The first wos in June 2007 when il wos reviewed downword by
2@ bosis pohts, from 10.0 per cent to 8.0 per cenl, with the width ol the interest
role conidor reduced lrom +l- 300 to +/- 250 bosis points. The second wos in
October 2m7 when the MPR wos roised by l0O bosis points, from 8.0 lo 9.0 per
cent, with lhe inlerest rote conidor removed, in response 1o onlicipoted chonges
in economic ond finonciol condilions. The MPR wos then mode lo serve os the
ovemighl (repo) role. The lost wos in December 2007 when the MPR wos
increosed by 50 bosis points, from 9.0 to 9.5 per cenl.

lV. ,tlelhodology of the dudy
The objeclive here is to estimote the deterministic relotionship between lhe
voriobles in line with ihe lheoreticol postulotion ond policy expeclolion. As
mentioned, il is ihe generd expectotion thoi the monetory policy rotes be the
signol rote to deposil money bonks' credit operolions, such thot when the
monelory oulhority considers inlerest roles too high beyond whot is judged
oppropriote lo stimulote invesimenl, o cut in monetory policy rote (which implies
eose of occessing iunds by DMBS through lhe Cenhol Bonk discount window) is
expecled to induce DMBS to lower the cost of iending. A cose where o couseeffecl relolionship connol be esloblished. lhe implicotion is thol chonges in lhe
MPR ore exercises in fulility os lhe credit morkel would hove been operoting
oulside the influencing foctor of lhe Centrol Bonk. ln other words, such o lock of
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couse-effect relotionship imdies lhol lhe effecls of monetory policy ore nol
tronsmitted to the rest ol the economy. Furthermore, becouse we recognize lhe
lock of sophislicotion in lhe NiTerion finonciol morket, lhe poper corisiders it
opproprbte to ossess lhe likely effect of some monetory voriobles on lhe cosl of
funds in lhe money morkei. Therefore, from o simple relotionship of the form;

ih=po+Ftmlx,+FtXt+et.

(t)

h b the inter-bonk role, mpr, is the monelory policy role, x, represents
monetory operolions voriobles theoreticolly odjudged lo be copoble of
influencing the dependenl vdi$le, ond er'6 lhe enor lem Jhol 's ossumed to be
Where

white nobe.
From o lime seri-.s peBpeclive, modelling economic vcriebles requies evoluoting
if lhe series ore stotlonory. Slotionory voriobles ond integroled setbs, demond

complelely ditfereni modelling skotegies. However, in order to ovoil lhe problem
of spurious resdls, it is necesory to lest the existence of unit rooh.s We opply o
bottery of unikool tests to both series, including the lroditionol Augmenled
Dickey-Fuller lesl ond the Ph ip-Penon tests. Once the series ore found lo be
integroled or if the ir ond lhe mpr move closely together ond sporodicolly
deviote from eoch other, we evoluote lhe presence of o long-run relolionship
between bolh series. Evoluoling this hypothesis is equlvolent to testing whether
the residuols from on OLS regression between ir, mp( ond Xr ir non-slofonory
ogoinsl the olternotive thot it b slolionory. Thus, we con ossess lhe unit root result
of lhe residuols,
et
in

:in

- 9o

- Fmpn. - 9rXt

l2t

lhe form;
Aer =

,er-r +

l2deri

(3)

Note thol while we included one logged term, Aer-,, in equotion 3 to conecl for
outoconeloJion. the logged terms could olso be more thon one li.e. Aer,r. The
choice of the log lenglh is guided by the Akoike lnformolion Crilerion (AlC).
5

Te5ling for unll roof in the mpr ls chollenging becouse lhis rote chonges discretely ond its ircremenls

cre inegulo y spoced in lime. An overwhehing mojoily of the literohre loib to reiect o unit root
bosed on the low pcirer ot unit rool lest when deoling with sedes lhot pre5enl intrequent chonges
(Homilton ond Jordo, 20021. We ioke one of the stonds in the literolue lesling tor tlle p(esence o, unit
root in the ir ond the lorgei role.
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is the ,ou stolistic with respeci lo the coefficbnt of er-i in equolion 2 ihot would
help us estoblish lhe cose for or otherwrse of o cointegrotion between the
voriobles ir, mpr ond Xr. Ihe decis'on rule is thol, if lhe lou stolislic (r) obtoined
from equolion 3 is less lhon or equol lo rc (i.e. r < rc), we re,ect lhe null hypothesis
of no cointegrotion. However, if t > tc, we occept lhe null hypothesis lhot lhe

series ore nol

coinlegroted-

V.

Dqlo ond Emptuicol Resulh
Dolo used in this study were obloined from the Cenhol Bonk of Nigerio: Moior
Economic, Finonciol ond Bonking lndicotors ond Bonk Anolysb System, Economic
ond Finonciol Review, ond the Finonciol Morkel Deolers Asociotion - Morkel
Updote. Monlhly series covering lhe period l999M0l -2009M09 were used.6

lhe voriobles used in the study ore presenled in loble I
glonce
in lhe oppendix. A
of lhe plol (figure I ) reveols thol lhe series ore
coneloted positively omong o number of vdbbles. wilhin the somple period, the
The summory slotistics of

ir hos followed the mpr. though not os close os would be expecled, porliculorly

between 1999 ond 2001.2005 ond 2006, ond from the second holf of 2008 io mid2009 (see figure 2). These periods wilnessed lcrge flucluotions in the ronge of +/lGl5 bosb poinls. Going by this, the success of the CBN in sleering lhe short-lerm
interest rotes loword the mpr. coupled wilh vciotions in the mpr ond the finonciol
frogility thot necessitoted the bonking consolllotion exercise, hos been morginol.
Except for mosl por, ol 1999,20Ol ond trom mid-2008 lhrough 2009 when the
inter-bonk rote exceeds the mpr, for most port of the rest of lhe somple period,
lhe ir wos below the mpr, on indicotion thot the inlerbonk fund morkel hos, for
mosl times in lhe somple period, been liquid. ln lerms of spreod, lhere is
consideroble heterogeneity of these voriobles ocross lime. For exomple, while the
overoge deviotion between 1999 ond mid-2001 wos oboul lOOObps, it wos only
obout 500 bps from mid-20o1 1o mid-2005.
Toble 3 shows unil rool lesls on lhe order of inlegrotion of lhe voriobles dependent ond independent bosed on the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) ond
lhe Phillip-Penon (PP) closses of unil root tests.T The ADF ond PP tesl the null
hypothesis for voriobles of interest thof ore non-stotionory ond oscertoin the
number of times voriobles need to be differenced to onive ot slotionority. As
. The monthly series were obloined by inlerpolotion of quqterly sedes tor periods where monthly
figures could not be obloined
/ As observed in nole 4 obove, the p.ice{eloled voriobles hove been found lo be slotionory, olbeit
firsl difference,

compored lo the quontity{eloted vcrioblg thot ore slotionory ol levels.

ol

t7

Bulus: The Nigeria Inter-Bank and Monetary Policy Rates Nexus

shown on the toble, both the ADF ond the PP lests strongly support the
hypotheses thot growth in bonking system credit (BCRfGWT), foreign exchonge
nel flow (FOREXNTFLOW) ond growth in brood monqf supply (M2GRWT) ore
siolionory ot levels. while lhe infer-bonk rote (lR), monetcry policy rote (MPR) ond
the IR-MPR spreod qe stotionory ot first differenced jrdging by the McKinnon
criticol volues of reieclion of the hypolhesis of unit root.
Since lhe unit root lests reveol thot BCRTGM, FOREXNIFLOW ond M2GRWI ore
l(0), while lR. MPR ond IR-MPR ore l(l), we went further lo oscerloin the possible
number of cointegnoling equotions. Result of lhe unreslrbted ronk tesl in toble 4
indicoles thot there ore 4 cointegroling equolions, wh e lhe Mox-eigenvolue tesl
indicotes thot lhere ore 3 cointegroling equolions both ol 5 percent levels. From
the Johonsen multivoriote tesl result, the normolized cointegrolion equotion is;

i

= + 0.98irmpr 1o.98mpr +

6.6i62n*t

- O"AAOI3f orexnetflow -

0.0092bcrlgwt,

(4t

All coefficients ore significont going by volues of thek respective stondord enors.
However, except for the vorioble d (bcrfgwt), the odjustmenl coefficients in the
equolion for other voriobles ore insignificont.

V.l

Ihe Long-run Slolic Regresslon odel ond Colnlegrolion Teel
Hoving estoblished the stolionority levels of ihe voriobles ond the possibility of
coinlegroting equolions, we therefore, tesled for lhe possible cointegrotion
omong the voriobles by odopting the Engle ond Gronger two-step method iesting ihe stotionodty of the residuols generoied from running o stotic regression
model in levels. A cose for cointegrotion is esloblished when the residuols is found
io be stotionory. Toble 4 reports result of the stolic regressicn model, while toble 5
reports the result of lhe cointegrotion test.
Given the ADF ond PP criticol volues, voriobles in the co-integrotion regression
model ore soid to be co-integroted. Thus, monetory polby rote, growlh in brood
money supply. growth in bonking system credit ond net flow of foreign exchonge
cointegrole with inler-bonk role. ln other words, the results reiecl the null
hypothesis ol unil-rool lor lhe residuols, confirming the presence of o
fundomentol long- run relotionship omong the voriobles.
Given lhe non-stotionory behoviour of lhe ir ond ils co-integrolion with ihe mpr
ond Xr. the most noturol qpprooch is on enor coneclion model (ECM) wiih the
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mpr os lhe long lerm onchor.8 This opprooch is nol novel in the literoture. ln focl, il
hos been opplied by Noutz ond Offermonns (m6t, ond Somo ond Thornton
12002) for E(ro zone ond lhe federol funds role in United Stoles. respectively. The
ECM we eslimote is formuloted os follows:

Air=OrA

(in

- mprlu

+ e2Unpt?+ O:dtis +

AA)(r-i +

6ECM4

+Ut

{5)

where ir is lhe inler-bqnk rote, mpr the monetory policy role, X o veclor of other
explonolory voriobles. A is the firstdifference operotor. The porometer 0r is the
rote ol which the deviolions of ir from the mpr ore closed to eoch other. The
vector of olher explonotory voriobles, X. involves severol monelory operotions
voriobles. growlh of money supply (to occount for lhe liquidity effect in the inierbonk morket), growth of deposit money bonks credil (to occounl for the nondiscretionory injection ond droinoge of funds through open morkel operotions)
ond lhe foreign exchonge net flolv (to occount for the possible impoct of the
demond for ond supply of foreign cunency in the inter-bonk funds morketl.
Toble 6 below shows lhe results ol the over-porometerized model wilh oll the
voriobles logged over lhree periods. The estimotion is in line with Engle ond
Gronger (1987). The model performed well in terms of elementory dicgnostic
tests: ihe coefficient of delerminolion, the F ond lhe DW Stotistics. ln terms of
individuol voriobles, however, some ore found to hove no s(;nificont
effect/contribution to lhe regression model, lhus, necessitoling lhe eslirnotion of
o more porsiTonious model, the result of which is in toble 7.
The resull in toble Z is prefened to lhot of toble 6 since it hos more robust
significont regressors, lower Schwoz (SC) criterion. The result olso reporls o beller
ond well-defined enor conection term, EClrLr, which b significont ond conies the
expecled s(7n. The enor corection term indicotes o feedbock of 159 percent of
the previous month's disequillibro from the long-run regressors on the regressond
(inter-bonk role).

Y.2

Diognosllc lests
the robuslness of the model, we pertormed diognostic tests ond lhe
resulls ore os shown in loble 8. The Jorque-Bero lesl for normolity of residuol
ossumption is not violoted, therefore lhe inference is volid. The resuli showed thol
To confirm

3

lt is wodh menlioning thot on enor corection specificorion could dso be obtoined rqn q mqe
is jusi modeled os o furrction of ils o,vn logs, logs lrorn ttE mpr dus

generol specificolion where the ir
other controls.
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the enor process corld be described os nornol. Similorly, the B-G sericl
correlolion LM test indicoles thot lhe null hypothesis of no firsl-order
ouloconelofion of the enor term is occepled, iusl os on the bosis of White lest
there b Heleroscedosticity. The specificotion enor (going by Romsey Resel test)
suggesls the occeptonce of the odditive model bosed on lhe F-slotistic ond o Pvolue of of 0.043440. The resulls suggest thot the model is robust for pol'cy
onotysis.

Slrucfurol slobfity lest of the model wos conducted using the Cumulolive Sum
(CUSUM) test ond the CUSUM of squores test. This is necessory in view of the foct
thol stobility oI the model will detem*re the exlenl 1o which we con moke
forecosl conceming behoviour of the voriobles in the model. FQure 4 shows the
plot suggesting the model is conecfly specified ond slruclurolly stoble, since the
CUSUM lies within lhe 5 percent signif'rconce bound. The CUSUM of squores lesl
(see figure 5) equolly shows the presence of struclurol stobility, port'lculorly from
2006 when lhe instrumenl of monetory policy role wos introduced by lhe Cenlrd
Bonk. This is on indicotion of moderotion in lhe \/olotility of the interbonk role.

Vl.

Summory ond Concludlng Remork3
lnter-bonk morkels ore omong the most importont in lhe finoncicl system. They
ore the focus ol centrd bonks' implementotion of monetory pdicy ond hove o
significont effect on ttte whole economy. Tronsoctions in the inter-bonk funds
morke, provides signc of whot obtoins in the open credit morkel. ln this work,
though our moior concem is in exomining ihe possibility of o cointegroling
relolionship beh^/een lhe inler-bonk fund morkel roie ond lhe monetory policy
role, lhe onchor role for other roles in lhe money morkel, the rnpr connoi be
token os the only determinont of the inter-bonk role. To thot effect, o number of
other monetory voriobles ore loken inlo occount in exomining the behoviour of
the inter-bonk role. ln this poper, we provide o porsimonious model of inler-bonk
fund role determinolion using monthly doto. This lies ot ihe heort of monetory
policy.
Results of the estimotes

indicole lhe significonce of the mpr in our inter-bonk rote
equolion. The result - thol the monelory policy rote ond the Nigerio inter-bonk
rotes ore cointegroted - hos molor economic implicolions. lt meons thol when
the Centrol Bonk implements monetory policy by chonging the monetory policy
rote, the inter-bonk rote will olso chonge thereby ensuring thot ,he effects of
monetory policy ore konsmilted 1o lhe rest of the economy. The vorioble
meosuring "spreod" produced o strong ond positive coefficienl indicoting thot o
rise in ir-mpr increoses lhe cosl ol inter-bonk intermediotion, reflecting the risk-
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oversive disposilion of morkel operolors. Similorly, lhough growth in money supply
is lound 1o be signif'rcont in bolh cunenl ond logged periods, il toiled in corrying
the expecled sign in the cunenl perbd ond when logged two periods. lt is only
when logged three periods lhot lhe coefficients conform to lhe opriori
expeclolion. The vodobles meosuring growth in bonk credit ond nelflow of
foreign exchonge ore lound to be signmcont ond corry the expecled signs. ln oll,
ihe result b robust with the model expolining 98 percent of the behoviour of the
inler-bonk rote, seriol conelotion free ond low AIC ond SC.
ln conclusion, while these results ore preliminory, os o number of issues perlinenl in
lhe inter-bonk mo*et ore nol fully occounted for in this work (issues such os the

implicotion of the chonge in reserve rnointenonce period, the impoct of the
bonking sector reform exercise on the funds morket, Centrol Bonk inlervenlion
lhrough REPO, finonciol crisis ond inler-bonk role behqvbur, the effecl of liquidity
hoording in the inler-bonk morket spreod, ond the impoct of lending relotionships
between bonks in the morkel on flow of funds ond the inler-bonk role, omong
others), they nevertheless coll our oltention to the need for policy pro-octiveness
in o woy thol would slrengthen the onchor role of the rnpr, in porticulor, ond, in
generol, influencing the pottem of movement of lhe other explonotory voriobles.
These ore promising oreos worthy of ottention in fulure reseorch.
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Toble 3o: Cointegrollon Tesl Results
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Toble 3b: Result of Johonren mulllvoriqle colntegrollon tesl

Sfoffslic
Ho:r4
Ho:r= I
Eigen volue = O.4224O8
Mox Eigen stot. = 68.O620 4

)rr- Iesl

fu,".. Iesl Slolislk

Ho:r4
Ha:r>l

Eigen
Troce

indicoles presence o[ ore cointegroting vector for lhe model.
relolionshp omong lhe vcriSles under conside(otion.
Tesl
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Toble 5: Urdl Root tesl lor the Re3ldud3
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Ioble 6: Over-Porometerlzed Eror Conecllon llodel
Deperdent Vorioble: D(1R,2)
Melhod: Leosl Squores
Somple (odjusted) : I 999M06 20O9M09
lncluded observofions: 124 ofter odjustmenls

Vorioble

Coefficienl

Std.

Bror

t-Stolistic

Prob

0.889850

o.om42

3.61792

0.0000

D(TRMPR(-r),2)

-0.005323

4.197347
4.1@827
0.r 95898
o.121228
o.932661
0.092385
-o.r89125
4.070582

0.03{325
o.o7t676
0.061577
0.057626

{.r s5079
-2.753303

o.8771

D0RMPR(-2),2)

D(rRMPR.2)

D(TRMPR(-3).2)
D(tR(-21,21

D(rR(-3),2)
D(MPR,2)
D(MPR(-r1,2)
D(MPR (-21.2)

D(MPR(-3),2)

-r.78357r
2.896788

o.ou288

I

0.r@056
o.133724
0.145195
0.r r933/

8.552095
0.69086s

.885714

0.0070
o.0775
o.oo45

0.0622
0.0000
0.49

l3

-t.293651

0.1988

-0.59 | 449

0.5556

D(M2GRwT.2)
D(M2GRWr(-r ).2)
D(M2GRwT(-2).2)

0.0r 4201
0.001 6r 2

o.w7942

1

.851013

0.0671

r

0.0r 238

0.r 43455

0.8862

0.0r50r8

0.0r 09 r 5

D(M2GRWT(-3).21

o.w)fi2

0.1719
o.7566

D(FOREXNETFLOW,2)
D(FOREXNETFLOW(-r ),2)
D (FOREXNETFLOW(-2).2)

0.008049
6.778.C5

47
0.310844
0.257779
-0.r 69636

0.789 4

-r.62E-05

D

(FOREXNETFLOW(-3),2)

r

arE-05

0.000139
-0.000136

D(BCRTGWT,2)

{.0020il

D(BCRTGWT(-r),2)
D(BCRTGWT(-2),2)
DtBCRTGWT (-3).2)

-0.0033,10

RES|Dol(-r)

-1 .575117

a

{.C[9473

R-squored
Adiusted R-squored
S.E. of regression
Sum squored resid
Log likelihood

Durbin-Wotson stol

-0.003093

{.000/95

0.982114
0.9 28000

0.908695
82.5727 4
-r 50.739r
| .9207 43

?.57E45
9.72E45
7.92E45
o.oo2354
0.004314
o.ffi3266
o.ffi2263
0.132173
0.042037

| .37 59

1A25324

-l.7t54t3
4.854437
-1.007800
{.9,17055
{.3sr 80s

-l l.9l7l I
{.1t5469

Meon dependent vor
S.D. dependenl vor
Akoike info crilerion
Schwoz criterion
F-stotislic
Prob(F-stotistic)

0.8656
0.1572
0.0894
0.3949

0.3r60
0.3459

0.72s7
0.0000
0.9083
0.004839

6.126412
2.818372
3.364233

23€.7343
0.000000
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Iob{e 7: Pq6lmonlous Regresslon llodel
Dependent Vorioble: D(1R,2)
Method: Leost Squores
SomPe (od.iusled): | 999M05 2009M09
lncluded observolions: 124 ofler odjuslments
Vorioble

Coeflicient

Sld.

Bror

t-Stotistic

Prob

56.59418
-3.323693

0.0000

-r.5r6980

0.1321

2.9620,39

o.fi1126

-2.482612
3.219429

0.0037
o.1212
0.0000
0.0145
0.0015

0.004519

2.299617

0.0233

3.067 542

0.@27

o.894147

o.otu27

D{TRMPR(-2).21

-o.1677 47

D(TRMPR(-3).2)

{o7r

D(rRMPR.2)

0.r 6751 6

0.050470
0.047 | 85
0.056s54

o.08.2619

o.0529213

0874380
4.212318
0.0t4382
0.0 t0392

0.080656
0.085522

D(FOREXNETFLOW(-2).2)

0.000154

D(FOREXNETFLOW(-s),2)

{.0(pr25

RESrDor (-l

-1.588040

5.33E45
6.r r E-05
o.t22157
0.078750

D(rR(-2).2)
D(rR(-3).2)
D(MPR.2)
D(MPR(-2),21

D(M2GRwT.2)
D(M2GRWI(-2),2)

)

C
R-squored
Adiusled R-squored
S.E. of regression
Sum squored resid

Log lkelihood

Durbilwotson siot

580

-0'0r t956
0.981533
o.979537
o.876377
85.25206
-152.7189
I .919135

r

.56r 555

10.8409 t

-2.04716'.1

-13.000m
{.151815

Meon dependenl vor
dependent vor
Akoike info criterion
Schworz criterion

S.D.

F-stotistb
Prob(F-stotistic)

0.0012

0.0430
0.0000

0.8796
0.004839

6.1264t2
2.57288.5

2.968560
491 .5538

0.000000
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Ioble 8: Results DlognGtc

A

J-B

June 2010

Tesls

lerl for normolity

21

S€rie6: R€siduals
Sampl€ 1 999MO6 2OOgirOg

20

ObsarvaliorE 1 24

15

5.19e-17
o.022560

12
Std. Dov.

a

Kuatosi3

I

o.432530
1 279579

9'193254

JarqLE-B€ra 232-0127
Probability
o-oooo(}q

o
-2

B.

4.023793
-2.o844a6

o

-1

2

1

Breusch-Godfrey Seriol Conelollon

u

Test

F-stotistic

4.556776

Probobllity

o.o12572

Obs'R-squored

9.567746

Probobillty

0.008364

C.

Whlle Heleroskedosliclty Test

F-slolistic

14.26327

Probobility

0.000000

Obs*R-squored

95.18335

Probobility

0.000000

D.

Romsey

RESET

Test:

F-stolislic

2.548515

Probobility

0.043440

Log likelihood rotio

1

.28442

Probobility

0.023547

|

